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RESEARCH ARTICLE
The Crime-Conflict Nexus and the Civil War 
in Syria
Christina Steenkamp
There is a strong relationship between organised crime and civil war. This article 
contributes to the crime-conflict nexus literature by providing a consideration 
of the role of organised crime in the Syrian conflict. It provides an overview of 
pre- and post-war organised crime in Syria. The article then builds the argument 
that war provides opportunities for organised crime through the state’s diminished 
law enforcement ability; the economic hardship which civilians face during war; and 
the abundance of armed groups who all need to generate revenue. Secondly, the 
paper argues that organised crime also affects the intensity and duration of war 
by enabling militants to reproduce themselves materially and to build institutions 
amongst the communities where they are active. The relationships between armed 
groups and local populations emerge as a central theme in understanding the 
crime-conflict nexus.
Introduction
By January 2017, the Syrian civil war had 
produced close to 5 million refugees, 6.3 
million internally displaced persons, 13.5 mil-
lion Syrians who required humanitarian aid 
(UNHCR 2016) and estimates put the num-
ber of fatalities due to the war at 500,000 
(Graham-Harrison 2017). Western popular 
interest in the Syrian civil war tends to focus 
on the use of chemical weapons by the gov-
ernment of Bashar Al-Assad; the military suc-
cesses and brutality of the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS);1 Russian military involvement 
and the refugee ‘crisis’ which resulted from 
the conflict. This paper focuses on an often-
overlooked aspect of the conflict, but one that 
is central to its longevity and intensity: the 
role of organised crime in the Syrian civil war. 
Early in the conflict, UNESCO raised alarm 
about the increased illegal trade in antiqui-
ties and artefacts from Syria. Both the poli-
cymaking (Yazigi 2014; Hallaj 2015; Taylor 
2015) and academic communities (for exam-
ple Lister 2015b; Kravitz and Nichols 2016; 
Keatinge 2014; Herbert 2014) have since 
acknowledged the proliferation of organised 
crime during the war. These studies show 
how protagonists in the Syrian conflict are 
involved in a range of illegal economic activi-
ties, including people trafficking, oil smug-
gling, the illegal narcotics trade, kidnapping 
and looting. These activities vary in profit-
ability, but they generate sufficient funds to 
allow insurgents and the government to buy 
weapons, pay combatants, provide social ser-
vices and establish institutions in the areas 
under their control. These factors are crucial 
in reproducing the armed groups and main-
taining the conflict.  Yet, very little is known 
about how the war provides opportunities 
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for this illicit economy to expand. This paper 
asks how war and organised crime affect each 
other in the context of the Syrian civil war.
There has been a steady recognition of the 
role of organised crime in sustaining violent 
conflict (summarised by De Boer and Rosetti 
2015) and the threat it poses to international 
peace, security and stability (Bergeron 2013; 
Bosetti et al 2016; Briscoe 2015; Cockayne 
and Pfister 2008). This interplay between 
organised crime and war, the ‘crime-conflict 
nexus’, has been studied in various contexts, 
including Colombia (Felbab-Brown 2005); 
Mali (Lacher 2012); Afghanistan (Goodhand 
2008) and Iraq (Williams 2009). This article 
contributes to the study of the crime-conflict 
nexus by illustrating, in the Syrian context, 
how armed groups simultaneously engage in 
political and criminal activities, how organ-
ised criminal activity is politically signifi-
cant in the context of war and how civilians 
engage with the crime-conflict nexus. 
This article states that organised crime in 
Syria is both a consequence of the war and, at 
the same time, a driver of the war. It proceeds 
from the premise that the crime-conflict 
nexus is central to understanding the civil 
war in Syria. In the first half, the focus will 
be on how war creates space and opportuni-
ties for organised crime. The civil war weak-
ens the state’s law enforcement capacity and 
thus lowers the opportunity costs for those 
engaging in organised crime. Furthermore, 
the war causes unprecedented levels of hard-
ship amongst the population. This creates a 
domestic demand for consumer goods on the 
black or grey markets and produces a pool 
of labour, which can be absorbed into the 
illicit economy. Consequently, the civil war 
produces a range of non-state armed groups 
that need money to wage war. These groups 
turn to the illicit economy to raise funds and 
are instrumental in expanding these markets 
and opening new avenues for international 
organised crime.  
The second half of the argument focuses on 
how organised crime drives war. The expand-
ing illicit economy, which characterises 
the Syrian civil war, affects its intensity and 
duration. Armed groups now have access to 
funds, which means they can afford to wage a 
longer and more violent war. Secondly, armed 
groups also have resources to spend on pro-
viding social and political goods in the com-
munities where they are based. This means 
that they can become perceived as legitimate 
political actors and this can translate into 
popular support. This further fragments the 
central state and destroys the social con-
tract between state and society (Grynkewich 
2008), making a resolution of the conflict 
more complex. These relationships between 
local populations, armed groups and organ-
ised crime are central to understanding how 
organised crime and war interconnect.
This research provides an analysis of the 
ways in which crime and conflict mutually 
reinforce each other: how war creates oppor-
tunities for an illicit economy to expand and 
how organised crime, in turn, facilitates war. 
The study begins with an overview of the lit-
erature on organised crime and war. It then 
proceeds to a description of organised crime 
in Syria, both before and during the civil war. 
Following this overview, the first part of the 
argument (that war provides opportunities 
for organised crime) presents a considera-
tion of the conditions which make organised 
crime in Syria feasible. The second part of the 
argument (that organised crime is a driver of 
conflict) is then advanced through an analy-
sis of how armed groups use the revenues 
gained in the illicit economy and how that 
impacts the conflict. The article concludes 
with reflections on the contribution of this 
case study to the crime-conflict nexus and 
the prospects for peace in Syria.  But, first 
a conceptualisation of organised crime is 
needed. 
Organised Crime
Organised crime remains a heavily contested 
concept. The dominant conceptualisations 
of organised crime assume a law enforce-
ment perspective. The Palermo Convention 
and the United Nations Office for Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), for example, defines an 
organised criminal group as: 
Steenkamp: The Crime-Conflict Nexus and the Civil War in Syria Art. 11, page 3 of 18
A structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time 
and acting in concert with the aim 
of committing one or more serious 
crimes or offences…to obtain, directly 
or indirectly, a financial or other mate-
rial benefit (in Hansen 2014: 64–65).
In 2011, the UK Home Office defined organ-
ised crime as:
Individuals, normally working with 
others, with the capacity and capa-
bility to commit serious crime on a 
continuing basis, which includes ele-
ments of planning, control and coor-
dination, and benefits those involved. 
The motivation is often, but not 
always, financial gain (in Bergeron 
2013: 6).  
The definitions share several characteris-
tics: they emphasise the collective nature of 
organised crime (perpetrated by a group, not 
individuals); its longevity; that it takes place 
outside the law and that the overall aim is to 
turn a profit. This approach is underpinned 
by normative assumptions about a ‘legal’ 
vs ‘illegal’ dichotomy (Cockayne and Pfister 
2008: 13) which is assigned by the state. 
These traditional definitions lead to a focus 
on state building and the ability of political 
institutions to respond to organised crime. 
The law enforcement perspective fits neatly 
into the Liberal Peace paradigm with its 
focus on democracy promotion, the rule of 
law and the building of state institutions. 
Yet, there are significant weaknesses to this 
law enforcement perspective. It assumes that 
the state is legitimate and criminal organisa-
tions are illegitimate – even though this view 
might not be shared by the population in 
places where state authority is contested or 
weak (Cockayne and Pfister 2008: 13). These 
state-assigned labels might thus not neces-
sarily reflect civilian notions of what consti-
tutes legitimate economic activity. In fact, 
there may be significant local support for an 
‘illegal’ economy. 
A further weakness of the law  enforcement 
perspective on organised crime is that it 
underplays the way in which these activi-
ties change the nature of the state itself. 
The close relationships fostered between 
organised crime and state officials lead to a 
distortion of local economies as  government 
policies aim to serve the interests of organ-
ised crime, rather than the population 
(Jesperson 2015: 26). Local economies 
change over time as organised crime groups 
extract taxes and enable civilians to circum-
vent formal markets.
Another criticism of the law enforce-
ment approach holds that organised crime 
is often an activity, rather than an identity, 
as actors dip in and out of illegal activi-
ties. Organised criminal networks possess a 
range of motivations, which are not always 
 financially-motivated, but could be political 
(James 2012: 223–225). This recognises the 
diverse portfolio of activities to which one 
conflict actor can subscribe.
This alternative conceptualisation of 
organised crime moves away from the legal-
illegal dichotomy, towards a recognition of 
the complex political, economic and social 
environments within which organised crime 
networks operate. This approach is undoubt-
edly more in line with the assumptions of 
this study, which recognises that organised 
crime networks can have a range of goals. 
Consequently, violence becomes dual-pur-
pose, serving both individual and strategic 
organisational needs simultaneously (Green 
and Ward 2009).  
This is particularly relevant to the crime-
conflict nexus where the boundaries 
between political and criminal actors are 
increasingly blurred. Not only are their 
goals varied, but their impact can vary as 
they establish social, economic and politi-
cal relationships with the populations and 
states where they are active. In addition, 
the critical approach to organised crime 
emphasises the relationship between 
local populations, armed groups and the 
illicit economy – a recurring theme in this 
research. 
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Civil War and Organised Crime
The relationship between organised crime 
and conflict has become increasingly recog-
nised in the study of civil war. Theories of 
‘new wars’ developed in the 1990s as scholars 
turned their attention to the opportunities 
which globalisation and war present to the 
growth of organised crime (Duffield 2001; 
Kaldor 1999; Kaplan 1994; Münkler 2005; 
Van Creveld 1991). In the new post-Cold War 
context, regimes and insurgents alike had to 
find alternative sources of revenue as exter-
nal backers (particularly the USA and USSR) 
retreated from involvement in internal con-
flict (Williams 2012: 39–40). Some scholars 
(notably Collier and Hoeffler 2004) analysed 
how civil war presents profit-making oppor-
tunities to insurgents and states – often by 
exploiting natural resources such as oil, dia-
monds or minerals. The argument was that 
the potential for self-enrichment in a conflict 
setting will determine the war’s feasibility, 
intensity and longevity. This greed thesis elic-
ited a great deal of academic interest and cul-
minated in a debate about the importance 
of political economy explanations for war, 
 vis-à-vis more conventional political expla-
nations related to inequality, discrimination, 
and political grievance (Ballentine 2003; 
Berdal 2005; Herbst 2000; Pugh et al 2004).2 
Both new wars theories and the greed 
thesis emphasise the role of globalisation 
in facilitating the activities of international 
criminal networks and, at the same time, 
the increasing cooperation between organ-
ised crime and violent political actors. This 
cooperation is beneficial to both the politi-
cal actors and the organised crime groups: 
those engaged in political violence engage in 
organised crime to raise funds, whilst organ-
ised crime benefits from the opportunities 
which war presents. 
An interpretation of this relationship 
gained prominence in the years following the 
9/11 terror attacks on the USA. The ‘crime-
terror’ nexus literature focuses on the dynam-
ics and networks involved in the funding 
of international terrorism (Dishman 2005; 
Hutchinson and O’Mally 2007; Makarenko 
2004; Oehme 2008; Sanderson 2004; Shelley 
and Picarelli 2005). In doing so, these stud-
ies uncover the alliances between organised 
crime and terror networks which exist for 
their mutual benefit. The literature illus-
trates how international terrorism became 
involved in a range of organised criminal 
activities in order to fund political violence 
(Makarenko 2004; Shelley and Melzer 2008). 
Increasingly, a similar approach to the 
study of civil war was adopted. Here the 
spotlight falls on particular, geographically 
bound conflicts – as opposed to the global 
nature of international terrorism.  It became 
known as the crime-conflict nexus (De Boer 
and Bosett 2015; Lacher 2012; Cornell and 
Jonsson 2014; Kemp 2004).   
The crime-conflict nexus literature exposes 
the fallacy of upholding a hard distinction 
between organised crime and political vio-
lence: organised criminal groups can assume 
political goals and, likewise, political groups 
can engage in organised crime in efforts 
to fund their use of violence (Bosetti et al 
2016: 3). Violence increases in a context 
where the aims and activities of organised 
crime and political violence become increas-
ingly blurred. Organised crime and conflict 
become interdependent and exacerbate 
each other (McMullin 2009: 84). In the war 
economy that results, violence becomes an 
entry point for participation in these activi-
ties (Taylor 2015: 2) as groups that use force 
are more successful in gaining access to 
economic opportunities. Indeed, the crime-
conflict nexus literature illustrates the extent 
to which organised crime during violent con-
flict is political: it funds political violence, it 
changes the abilities of local political actors 
and it has long-term political consequences 
for the state and peacebuilding. 
The focus in this article is on the ways in 
which civil war presents opportunities for 
organised crime – as activities, rather than a 
set of actors – to flourish. A central assump-
tion that underpins this approach is that all 
or most armed groups in Syria are involved 
in both political and criminal violence. This 
research is interested in how large-scale 
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political violence present opportunities for 
organised crime, which in turn, stimulates 
and prolongs the conflict. 
Different sections of society are typically 
involved in the illicit economy during war: 
the populations that produce and consume 
the illegal goods and services, the crime 
groups such as mafia and drug trafficking 
organisations, armed military groups such 
as terrorists, insurgents or paramilitaries, 
as well as corrupt government officials and 
law enforcement personnel (Felbab-Brown 
2012: 3). A major theme in this paper is 
the centrality of the relationships between 
armed groups and the local populations in 
the crime-conflict nexus. War creates space 
for strengthening this relationship between 
insurgents and civilians.  The following 
discussions show how these relationships 
underpin the illicit economy that expanded 
during the civil war in Syria. 
The Civil War in Syria
The current conflict in Syria started in March 
2011 with popular protests against the 
authoritarian regime of President Bashar 
al-Assad and demands for the release of 
political prisoners (BBC News 2016).  The 
government responded violently and the 
protests spread and escalated.  It was initially 
seen as part of the 2010–2011 wave of popu-
lar uprisings against authoritarian regimes 
in states such as Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt and 
Libya, known as the Arab Spring. However, 
the Syrian uprising soon proved to be a more 
sustained and longer-term conflict and by 
2012 the International Red Cross officially 
labelled it a civil war. 
More than 1000 different groups are 
thought to be involved in the conflict 
(Al-Abdeh 2013). These include the govern-
ment of President Bashar al Assad, supported 
by Hezbollah in Lebanon; ISIS (the Salafist 
jihadist group who advocates a conservative 
version of Islamic rule); the Sunni Jihadist 
Jabhat al Nusra (the Front for the Defence 
of the Syrian People, which was allied with 
Al Qaeda, but since its split with Al Qaeda in 
2016, is now known as Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham); 
the YPG (the Kurdish People’s Protection 
Units); the Islamist groups Ahrar Al-Sham 
and Jaysh Al-Islam and the Free Syrian Army 
(Al Jazeera 2016; Crowcroft 2015). In addi-
tion to these high-profile groups, there are a 
myriad of smaller groups who come and go, 
and who exist in varying degrees of coopera-
tion with the larger groups (Sorenson 2016). 
The conflict has become internationalised, 
with Russia and Iran emerging as major mili-
tary and financial supporters of the regime, 
whilst the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia sup-
port the Sunni Islamist groups (Al Jazeera 
2016). 
A range of political, economic, ethnic and 
social factors caused this conflict. These 
include growing inequalities and youth 
unemployment that resulted from the eco-
nomic liberalisation policies that the Assad 
regime had implemented in the years pre-
ceding the uprising. The outbreak of war 
also signals dissatisfaction with the system of 
patron-client relationships which have been 
carefully cultivated by the Syrian Ba’athist 
regime. The state concentrated its provision 
of public services such as the provision of 
electricity, employment, schooling, agricul-
tural aid and health care in the areas where 
its support was strongest (De Juan and Bank 
2015: 94). The Alawite sect (of which Assad is 
a member) has long dominated the state and 
the resulting discontent amongst Sunnis also 
contributes to the conflict.3    
Pre-war Organised Crime in Syria
Organised crime is not new to Syria. The 
country has long been a transit point for 
drugs originating from Europe, Turkey and 
Lebanon and destined for Jordan, Iraq and 
the Persian Gulf (Al-Hemiary et al 2014). 
There is also a long-standing tradition of 
looting and antiquity smuggling from 
archaeological sites prior to the war in Syria 
(Casana 2015: 147).  Herbert (2014) provides 
a comprehensive historical narrative of pre-
war smuggling and organised crime in Syria. 
Local  cross-border tribes and groups have 
engaged in trafficking livestock and con-
sumer goods (and to a limited extent, drugs) 
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between Syria and its neighbours since the 
inception of the state after the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire. Initially, the Syrian govern-
ment was not directly involved in the illicit 
economy – except for individual government 
officials who may have benefited financially. 
In Herbert’s analysis, two major events cre-
ated motivation and opportunity for the 
Syrian regime to become more actively 
involved in organised crime. 
Firstly, Syria’s 1976 invasion and sub-
sequent presence in Lebanon heralded a 
period of entrenched cooperation between 
the Syrian government and Lebanese-
based criminal groups. Networks of bribery 
between government officials and smugglers 
developed. The Syrian military, in particular, 
became firmly entrenched in the Lebanese 
trade in hashish and heroin by taxing 
traffickers. 
Western sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s 
are the second major event that provided 
motivation and opportunity for the Syrian 
regime to expand its involvement in the 
transnational illicit economy. Syria helped 
Iraq to bypass these sanctions by encourag-
ing and directly operating smuggling net-
works that moved weapons, luxury goods, 
food and oil to and from Iraq. The Syrian 
regime retreated from direct involvement in 
smuggling after the 2003 US-led invasion of 
Iraq, but continued to tax the lucrative Iraq-
Syrian trafficking of artefacts and oil. 
Several factors can explain the success of 
the illicit economy in Syria before the civil 
war. Syria’s central geographic position in 
the Middle East makes it attractive for organ-
ised crime. It has access to the coast, which 
provides it with connections to international 
markets and gives it value as an export point. 
Syria is surrounded by weakened states and 
shares lengthy and poorly controlled borders 
with states that are known to harbour active 
international organised crime networks, 
notably Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon (The Global 
Initiative 2013). The country’s pre-war infra-
structure enhanced the feasibility of illicit 
economic activities: it has an elaborate road 
network linked to seaports, good electricity 
supply and relatively high levels of  industrial 
development (Kravits and Nichols 2016: 35). 
These factors, combined with the state’s 
inability (and unwillingness) to control its 
borderlands, create a fertile environment for 
organised crime.
This discussion implied that a range of 
actors were involved in Syria’s pre-war organ-
ised crime networks and many of them 
remain active. These include the local tribes; 
small-time cross-border smugglers; larger, 
more sophisticated trafficking networks 
and the Syrian regime itself. The Shabiha 
are an interesting example of a group that 
has straddled the pre-and post-war organ-
ised crime periods (Starr 2012). The Shabiha 
were a small group of government militias 
(mostly from Assad’s Alawite sect) who were 
deeply (and brutally) involved in trafficking 
and smuggling in the borderlands during the 
1980s and 1990s. The outbreak of civil war 
has led to an explosion in their numbers. This 
was partially due to the government’s policy 
of releasing career criminals in exchange for 
political loyalty during the early years of the 
conflict. The Shabiha illustrate how armed 
groups can simultaneously assume politi-
cal and criminal roles and how these roles 
can change over time: these groups remain 
deeply involved in war-time organised crime, 
but they also play a role in political violence 
as government militias which control towns 
and villages. The Shabiha illustrate an impor-
tant aspect of the crime-conflict nexus: an 
armed group’s ability to assume and shed 
political and criminal identities as circum-
stances change.
Participation in the illicit economy in Syria 
widened as the conflict intensified. The traf-
ficking of weapons into Syria at the start 
of the conflict illustrates this (The Global 
Initiative 2013: 2): initially, armed groups 
in Syria would procure weapons in neigh-
bouring countries (usually Iraq) and these 
would be smuggled into the country by 
vehicle, donkey or on foot. However, as the 
conflict intensified and became prolonged, 
weapons smuggling became more sophis-
ticated. By 2012 the Free Syria Army was 
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acquiring weapons through professional 
arms traffickers and international weapons 
 dealers. Entirely new business networks have 
emerged since the start of the war to supply 
the demand for weapons, fuel and consuma-
bles (Yazigi 2014: 7). It is difficult to paint an 
accurate picture of the nature of cooperation 
between armed political groups and criminal 
groups – not least because the distinction 
between political and criminal motives and 
activities are blurred (McMullin 2009: 89). 
What is clear, however, is that that insurgent 
groups have learnt how to capitalise on the 
economic opportunities which war presents.
Organised Crime During the Syrian 
War
Ultimately, this paper argues that organised 
crime both aggravates and is a consequence 
of the war in Syria. An overview of the range 
of illicit economic activities which exist in 
the context of the civil war in Syria is useful. 
The activities which will be described often 
co-exist in the same settings and are under-
taken by the same actors. Consequently, the 
focus is on discussing the activities which 
constitute the war-time illicit economy in 
Syria–rather than producing an account of 
each armed group’s involvement in these 
areas.
The crime-conflict nexus literature pro-
vides a ready tick-list of illegal economic 
activities which typically present profit-
making opportunities to conflict actors: the 
illegal trade and smuggling involving natu-
ral resources such as alluvial diamonds (e.g. 
Sierra Leone); timber (e.g. Cambodia); miner-
als (e.g. DRC) and oil (e.g. Iraq). International 
drug trafficking is a major explanation for 
the intensity and longevity of the Colombian 
civil war, where the FARC have been involved 
in cocaine production for decades (Cornell 
2005: 756), the heroin trade is closely asso-
ciated with Taliban involvement in poppy 
cultivation in Afghanistan (Goodhand 2008) 
and the Kosovo conflict was heavily influ-
enced by the billion-dollar narcotics trade 
in the Balkans (Andreas 2004; Chossudovsky 
1999). 
An armed group’s ability to control 
 movement from and into its territory is 
 crucial to its political and economic success. 
Control over territory in Syria is not only a 
sign of geopolitical military prowess, but also 
provides access to sources of revenue. A sec-
ondary, illicit economy has been built around 
the unofficial movement of commodities 
into areas and neighbourhoods under siege. 
Extracting bribes and fees at border cross-
ings or on highways is an important source 
of income for local militias and army officers 
(Ohl et al 2015; Yazigi 2014: 5). Rebels that 
control border crossings set fees for allowing 
vehicles and individuals to cross and for the 
movement of luxury items, food, livestock 
and oil to and from neighbouring countries 
(Herbert 2014). 
The most profitable form of cross-border 
trafficking involves oil. There is significant 
variation between different groups and 
regions in terms of how oil is extracted, 
transported, taxed and sold (Almohamad and 
Dittmann 2016). In some cases, local tribal 
chiefs are in charge of extracting oil from 
small oil fields under their control and pro-
duce about 300—1000 barrels a day (Hallaj 
2015). Local militias then tax oil smuggling 
in their territories or provide armed protec-
tion (at a price) to the rudimentary refineries 
(Herbert 2014: 78). 
ISIS, for example, is heavily involved in oil 
smuggling and extraction. At the height of 
its power, it controlled around 80 per cent of 
Syria’s oil fields (including the largest oil pro-
ducing area of Deir az-Zour) and produced 
65,000 barrels of oil per day (Almohamad 
and Dittmann 2016). Oil has become one of 
ISIS’s main sources of income. It is impossi-
ble to get an accurate estimate, but accord-
ing to some reports the organisation earned 
approximately US$2 million per day through 
its control and sale of oil in Syria and Iraq 
(Lister 2015b). ISIS sells oil to various local 
and international buyers, including its main 
adversary, the Assad government, through 
a series of middlemen (Almohamad and 
Dittmann 2016: 11). This strategic coop-
eration between the regime and one of its 
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fiercest adversaries illustrates the shifting 
and varying patterns of cooperation between 
armed groups which typify conflict settings 
(Staniland 2012).
Considerable international media atten-
tion has fallen on the production and smug-
gling of the illegal narcotic, Fenethylline, in 
Syria. This amphetamine is marketed under 
the street name ‘Captagon’ (Baker 2013; 
Henley 2014; Holley 2015). Captagon is pop-
ular as a recreational drug on the Arabian 
Peninsula (Herbert, 2014), but there are 
reports that combatants on all sides in the 
Syrian war are using it too – prompting TIME 
magazine to refer to them as ‘super-human 
soldiers’ (Baker 2013). By early 2014, the UN 
reported increases in the Syrian production 
of amphetamines (Kalin 2014) and some 
armed groups are directly involved in this 
production and cross-border trafficking of 
Captagon  (Kravitz and Nichols 2016: 38–39; 
The Global Initiative 2016: 23).
Looting is another form of economic activ-
ity that is dependent on the illicit market. 
Post-Saddam Iraq is an obvious example of 
large-scale looting in the context of violent 
conflict. Hospitals, museums and shops were 
emptied during the chaos that followed the 
toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime. 
Looting is often a symptom of the collapse of 
a political and security structure at the start 
of the war (Mac Ginty 2004: 863). In the case 
of Iraq and Syria, the availability of lootable 
items (like oil or cultural artefacts); the pres-
ence of large groups of people (as individuals 
and armed groups) who are able to loot; and 
a culturally permissive environment (Mac 
Ginty 2004), were  all in place to make loot-
ing possible. According to reports, members 
of pro-government groups are allowed to 
loot in areas previously held by rebels. Rebels 
loot factories and industrial areas under their 
control, selling the bounty on local or inter-
national markets (Hallaj 2015).  
The looting of antiquities has become a 
prominent feature of the Syrian conflict’s 
symbiosis with organised crime. In October 
2013, UNESCO warned about the increase in 
the looting of antiquities and other valuable 
artefacts from Syria and there were reports 
of endemic racketeering and smuggling 
in many of the rebel-held areas (Fielding-
Smith 2013). The stripping of archaeologi-
cal sites in Syria and the selling of artefacts 
on international markets are commonplace 
(The Guardian 2016; UNESCO 2013). By 2015, 
satellite imagery comparing historical sites 
before and after the start of the war, showed 
a significant increase in illegal archaeologi-
cal excavations in Syria (Casana 2015: 147). 
Interestingly, this analysis of archaeological 
digs found evidence of an increase in both 
minor looting (which is probably done by 
individuals and civilians who are merely try-
ing to survive economically), as well as severe 
looting which requires some organisational 
and mechanical capacity and is generally 
more destructive. The revenues for rebel 
groups through this trade have been esti-
mated at US$300—US$500 million in the 
two years since 2013 (Hallaj 2015: 4).
Control over grain is an unusual activity 
that forms part of organised crime in Syria. 
Martínez and Eng (2017) provide a fasci-
nating account of the political capital that 
bread provision holds in Syria, which helps 
to explain why bakeries are often targets in 
military campaigns. The subsidised provision 
of bread has long been a corner stone of the 
welfare state in Syria. As insurgent groups 
took control of new territory, they contin-
ued the provision of this public good as part 
of their ‘hearts and minds’ strategy. Various 
armed groups in Syria have become involved 
in a protection racket in the grain industry 
where bakeries must pay for ‘protection’ 
from other groups. In other cases, insurgent 
groups are directly involved in the milling of 
grain themselves (Al-Abdeh 2013). 
Kidnapping and hostage taking is another 
common activity for those involved in organ-
ised crime in conflict zones. Both rebels and 
state security forces in Syria are involved in 
kidnapping and hostage taking. Ransoms are 
often negotiated through chains of contacts 
involving local peace committees (Hallaj 
2015: 4). It is estimated that, in 2014, ISIS 
earned US$45 million from ransoms (Lederer 
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2014).  Hostage taking is of huge symbolic 
significance to terrorist groups, in particular: 
it provides them with publicity and a psy-
chological advantage vis-à-vis their enemy. 
In contrast to the indiscriminate nature of 
terror attacks in general, terrorist groups are 
generally selective in who they take as hos-
tages in order to maximise the publicity and 
impact (Forest 2012).
This section described how a range of 
conflict actors are involved in the very lucra-
tive illicit economy in Syria. These economic 
activities vary from the highly profitable 
extraction and trafficking in oil, to the illegal 
trade in narcotics and antiquities; from con-
trol over grain and bread production to kid-
napping and hostage taking. The activities 
discussed above are not necessarily exhaus-
tive of all illicit economic endeavours in this 
conflict, but they illustrate the diversity and 
complexity of the crime-conflict nexus in 
Syria. There is evidence that the illicit econ-
omy has expanded since the outbreak of the 
war and many of these activities are highly 
lucrative. The following section provides an 
explanation for this expansion of the illicit 
economy during the civil war and consid-
ers how civil wars provide opportunities for 
organised crime. 
War Provides Opportunities for 
Organised Crime
Several aspects of the Syrian war created an 
environment that created further opportu-
nities for organised crime. These conditions 
include a diminished state capacity, which 
reduced opportunity costs for the illicit 
economy; a population that faced unprec-
edented economic hardship which made 
participation in the illicit economy attrac-
tive and the existence of armed groups who 
needed to raise funds for weapons and other 
war-related expenses (Usman and Khan 
2013). 
Firstly, armed conflicts weaken state legiti-
macy and capacity to function, and thus 
provide opportunities for organised crime. 
This lowers the opportunity costs for insur-
gents and civilians to become involved in 
the illicit economy. It makes the black and 
grey markets more attractive and viable 
 alternatives for civilians in need of consumer 
goods and employment (Bosetti et al 2016: 3; 
McMullin 2009: 85). The state diverts much 
of its resources to the war, which reduces 
its capacity for maintaining law and order. 
Consequently, the state is less able to con-
trol borders and to contain illicit economic 
activity.
Secondly, sanctions against the Syrian 
government since 2011 contributed to fuel 
shortages for households, a decline in oil rev-
enue and had a negative effect on the liveli-
hoods of poor Syrians, in particular (Nasser 
et al 2013: 13). The sanctions, combined 
with the general economic catastrophe that 
accompanied the descent into war, stimu-
lated a demand for grey and black market 
goods and provided incentives for the smug-
gling of consumables. Drug production and 
trafficking, for example, provide profits for 
insurgents with which to buy weapons and 
to pay recruits. But, importantly, it also pro-
vides employment opportunities for civilians 
(Clarke 2016: 3) who can become couriers, 
be involved in the manufacturing process, or 
sell the drugs. 
The relationship between armed groups 
and the communities where they operate 
is central to understanding the opportuni-
ties which war presents for organised crime. 
In her focus on the illegal drugs economy, 
Felbab-Brown (2012: 4) argues that the non-
state armed groups provide security and act 
as economic and political regulators to local 
populations through their involvement in 
the illicit economy: they protect the local 
population’s livelihood from government 
efforts to repress the illicit economy, they 
mobilise revenues from these illicit activi-
ties towards social services and they pro-
tect local populations from other predatory 
groups.  
An example of how the population directly 
benefits from the decentralisation of the 
economy that characterises the crime-con-
flict nexus is again found in the oil industry 
in Syria: 
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With the rebels selling a barrel of oil 
for anything up to $22, refiners can 
make a profit of 30 cents on every 
litre of gasoline sold to the public. 
Those who make their living from 
road haulage and associated trades 
have seen their business boom; body 
shops, for instance, can’t keep up with 
the demand from truckers who need 
giant tanks fitted to the backs of their 
vehicles. Unemployed young men can 
now make a living selling fuel from 
roadside kiosks, and mechanics have 
plenty to do in repairing engines dam-
aged by the low-quality fuel. The free 
market that the rebels have uncon-
sciously fostered is a win-win for 
suppliers (the rebels themselves) and 
consumers (everyone else) (Al-Abdeh 
2013).
This illustrates how the insurgents’ stake in 
the oil industry has created a range of eco-
nomic opportunities for civilians in Syria. 
Armed groups expect to gain some level 
of popular support (even if this support 
is strategic and opportunistic, rather than 
principled) in exchange for the economic 
opportunities they provide.  
Thirdly, as the greed thesis emphasises, 
armed groups require funds in order to be 
able to afford to wage war. The illegal econ-
omy gives non-state armed groups access to 
resources that enable them to wage war. As 
the earlier section has shown, it is not only 
insurgents who turn to organised crime to 
raise funds, but states do so, too. Sanctions 
also affected the Syrian regime’s involve-
ment in the illicit economy as they became 
forced to seek alternative intermediaries for 
international transactions (Yazigi 2014). This 
provided new opportunities for the culti-
vation of local and international networks 
involving the state. 
This section has considered the ways in 
which war provides opportunities for organ-
ised crime in the Syrian context through: the 
state’s weakened law enforcement capacity; 
an economically vulnerable population that 
creates domestic markets and participates 
in the illicit economy; and the abundance of 
armed groups that require an income. These 
combined factors provide a suitable environ-
ment for organised crime to flourish. 
Organised Crime Contributes to War
The flipside of how war creates opportuni-
ties for the illicit economy, lies in asking 
how does organised crime contribute to the 
conflict? An obvious contribution lies in the 
funding streams it provides for rebel groups 
and the government to buy weapons, pay 
insurgents and help them to capture terri-
tory. This helps to prolong and intensify the 
conflict. These funds also enable them to 
provide political and social goods to commu-
nities, such as subsidising bread or setting 
up local mechanisms for resolving disputes. 
In exchange for these services, armed groups 
receive protection, loyalty and cooperation 
from local communities. It leads to a further 
fragmentation of a central authority. This 
section will illustrate how organised crime 
during war is political: it enables the mate-
rial reproduction of armed political groups 
and affects the socio-political infrastructure 
of a society.
Clearly, militants in Syria— as in most con-
flicts— raise significant profits from their 
involvement in the illicit market. We need 
to consider how armed groups spend these 
profits in order to understand the medium to 
long-term impact of this symbiosis between 
organised crime and armed conflict. Of 
course, it is entirely plausible that a certain 
amount of the profit disappears into the 
pockets of powerful individuals. However, 
much of armed groups’ expenditure goes 
towards paying its supporters; the acquisi-
tion of weapons and technology needed to 
fight the war; and lastly, into the institution-
building projects which many of the protag-
onists engage in. 
One of the major expenses for armed 
organisations in Syria are stipends for com-
batants. A new member of the FSA, for exam-
ple, would be paid $50 per month, but it is 
well known that the Islamist organisations 
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pay their members the highest salaries (Ohl 
et al 2015: 8). ISIS fighters claim to receive 
$100 per month from the organisation, in 
addition to other privileges such as stipends 
for their families or their rent and electricity 
(Weiss and Hassan 2016: 338). It is impossi-
ble to know the exact numbers of ISIS fight-
ers, but estimates vary wildly between the 17 
000 suggested by the Pentagon to 200,000 
suggested by the Kurdish forces (Fromson 
and Simon 2015: 9). Whatever the real figure 
may be, if all the tens of thousands of sol-
diers receive similar benefits, the organisa-
tion’s monthly expenditure is significant. 
Another obvious expense is weapons and 
ammunition for military campaigns. Its 
international allies, notably Russia, supply 
the Assad regime with weapons (Cordesman 
2015). However, the rebel groups tend to 
use weapons from a variety of sources. Many 
weapons are recycled from nearby conflicts 
in Libya or Iraq (Robson 2015) or had origi-
nally been sold by European manufactur-
ers to other MENA countries such as Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan and Qatar (Taylor 2015: 3). 
There is clearly a great degree of recycling 
and transferring of weapons which involves 
international weapons smuggling networks. 
Evidence shows that ammunition used early 
in the Syrian conflict was manufactured in 
a range of countries such as China, Sudan, 
Romania and Iran (Jenzen-Jones 2014). The 
varying suppliers and sources of weapons 
used in the Syrian conflict points to a sophis-
ticated (and expensive) weapons trafficking 
network which all groups tap into to con-
tinue their campaigns. Organised crime thus 
contributes to the political struggle by ena-
bling armed groups to buy weapons and to 
pay combatants. 
Insurgent organisations often engage in 
complex processes of institution-building and 
service delivery in the areas which they dom-
inate. Hezbollah in neighbouring Lebanon, 
for example, has established a sophisticated 
network of organisations through which 
they fund and manage schools, medical cen-
tres, urban infrastructure development pro-
jects and provide municipal services such 
as garbage removal in the Shia areas under 
their control (Flanigan and Abdel-Samad 
2009; Harb 2008). It is crucial for armed 
groups to enjoy some level of legitimacy and 
acceptance in their communities. If the pop-
ulation does not acquiesce to their presence, 
they will either withhold compliance with 
taxation, production or conscription policies 
directed by the military group, or they can 
instigate a violent challenge to the group’s 
presence in their community (Martínez and 
Eng 2017: 2). Armed groups’ provision of 
public and political goods is an important 
technique for acquiring this tacit acceptance. 
It is therefore unsurprising that insurgent 
groups are keen to engage in some form of 
institution-building in the regions where 
they have established military control. The 
notion of the caliphate is central to ISIS ideol-
ogy and means that the group has a dual pur-
pose of Jihad and state-building. The latter 
implies governance and the delivery of pub-
lic services.  In contrast to ISIS’s well-known 
brutality, this use of soft power (the ‘carrot’ 
in the carrot-and-stick approach) is an impor-
tant part of their strategy for dominance 
and control (Khalaf 2015; Lister 2015a: 49; 
McCants 2015: 152).4 It provides not only an 
extensive network of courts based on a very 
strict form of Sharia law (Lister 2015a: 45), 
but also schooling, medical care, public trans-
port, water and sanitation, flour for bakeries 
and price caps on necessities such as bread 
or rent (Lister 2015a: 47–8). Insurgents’ wel-
fare provision and governance roles are also 
central to their long-term military success as 
it creates an impression of a viable alterna-
tive to the existing regime and affirms their 
political legitimacy (Martínez and Eng 2017).
The state and insurgents, alike, use the 
funds raised through their involvement in 
organised crime to pay combatants; buy 
weapons and technology; and most impor-
tantly, to provide public and political goods 
to the populations where they are based. The 
provision of these social and political goods 
is essential in acquiring legitimacy and sup-
port from the communities where they are 
based. 
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Conclusion
This article describes the range of activities 
that constitute the war-time illicit econ-
omy in Syria. Various actors, including the 
state, insurgents, and local populations are 
involved in activities that include drug man-
ufacturing, oil trafficking, extortion and loot-
ing. Local populations are clearly important 
in the crime-conflict nexus: inhabitants of 
conflict areas directly participate in the illicit 
economy. In return, they are the recipients of 
political and social goods, which the armed 
groups provide and which are funded by the 
proceeds from organised crime. 
The research shows how war provides 
opportunities for organised crime by cre-
ating an environment where the central 
authority is unable to regulate economic 
activity within its borders. The economic 
hardship facing populations during war 
often leaves them with little choice but to 
engage in organised crime – either as direct 
participants in the activities, or as consum-
ers. Lastly, war facilitates organised crime 
by creating a pool of armed political groups 
who need to raise revenue in order to wage 
war. These groups dominate and expand the 
illicit markets. 
In turn, organised crime also exacerbates 
the conflict. Organised crime enhances an 
armed group’s capacity for violence. It thus 
affects the intensity and longevity of the war 
by providing armed groups with revenue with 
which to buy weapons to intensify their strug-
gle. Furthermore, it enables these groups to 
engage in institution-building and to provide 
social and political goods to the communities 
where they are based. This can buy them loy-
alty, cooperation and protection from civilians. 
This paper illustrated how militant groups 
in the Syrian war succeed in straddling both 
the political and criminal worlds. Organised 
crime during war is undoubtedly political in 
its effects. It enables armed groups to repro-
duce themselves materially, to build insti-
tutions and to gain some level of political 
legitimacy and cooperation. Local popula-
tions are central to the crime-conflict nexus: 
civilians provide markets and participants 
to the illicit economy and they are the 
 beneficiaries of armed groups’ spending.
So, if war creates opportunities for crime, 
and organised crime can drive war, then 
where does that leave the prospect for peace 
in Syria? It is not the intention of this paper 
to engage in depth with the implications of 
the crime-conflict nexus for peacebuilding, 
but it will certainly affect the post-war state 
and society.
Militants could be unwilling to negotiate an 
end to the conflict, as peace (and the accom-
panying disarmament and demobilisation of 
armed groups) will be bad for business. Armed 
groups may actively resist or spoil peacemak-
ing and peacebuilding activities, because 
their economic interests are so closely aligned 
to the informal economy.  Local populations 
too, may be less enthusiastic about peace and 
the economic uncertainty that it could bring. 
It could lead to a strategic trade-off where 
peace operations accept organised crime as 
part of the political settlement to achieve 
short-term stability. This could entrench 
organised criminal structures into the post-
war state. Smuggling networks rely heavily 
on the cultivation of political relationships 
and these are likely to exploit the fragile post-
war context. In addition to these political-
criminal networks, the close relationships of 
mutual dependency between civilians and 
armed groups will probably continue amid 
the unstable security, economic and political 
contexts which often characterise immediate 
post-war societies (Steenkamp 2009, 2014). 
Peace processes in places as diverse as Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Northern Ireland and South 
Africa have shown that peace could indeed 
strengthen war-time criminal networks. 
Insurgent groups leave behind formal and 
informal institutions, which could become 
an obstacle to the new post-war state’s 
attempts to provide centralised governance. 
It is unlikely that the future Syrian state will 
resemble the centralised version that existed 
before the war because of the way that the 
conflict has fragmented authority, territo-
rial control and governance in the country. 
The continuing relationships between local 
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communities, politicians and armed groups 
will pose a significant threat to the success of 
peace operations (Kemp et al 2013) and may 
well thwart efforts to establish a fair, transpar-
ent and effective post-war state and society.
Notes
 1 The organisation is also known as the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), 
‘Islamic State’ or by the Arabic acronym 
of ‘Daesh’.
 2 This became known as the ‘greed vs griev-
ance’ debate in war causation literature, 
but a deeper engagement with this debate 
does not fall within the remit of the paper. 
 3 More detailed discussions of the causes 
of the Syrian civil war can be found in 
Sorensen (2016) and Erlich (2014).
 4 ISIS’s effectiveness as a shadow state is 
debatable (Fromson and Simon 2015: 38) 
and some reports suggest that this might 
not be as sustainable as initially declared 
(Sly, 2014).
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